This is the third part in a short series of articles about speeches I listened to at the London Value Investor Conference on 9 May 2013.

To read Part 1, please click here.

To read Part 2, please click here.

I've added my comments below in brackets, to make it clear what is Marks, and what is my commentary.

 

Howard Marks of Oaktree Capital

Howard Marks has a fairly astonishing CV! He is the founder & Chairman of Oaktree Capital Management which currently has $79bn of assets under management. More impressive even than that, is that Bloomberg stated in 2010, "Oaktree's 17 distressed-debt funds have averaged annual gains of 19% after fees for the past 22 years - about 7 percentage points better than its peers".

Howard's memos are available online here, and come highly recommended, "When I see memos from Howard Marks in my mail, they're the first thing I open and read. I always learn something". (Warren Buffett).

He is the author of "The Most Important Thing: Uncommon Sense for the Thoughtful Investor".

 

The Human Side of Investing

Unlike previous speakers, who had talked mainly about the mechanics of equities investing, Marks talked more generally about the human, psychological side of investing. The subtitle to his speech is "the difference between theory and practice".

He began by outlining how the Efficient Market Hypothesis ("EMH") was just starting to be taught when he began his career, and in common with almost everyone outside of academia these days, he thinks EMH is untrue.

The reason EMH is untrue, is because markets are made up of people, with all our inherent flaws.

Theory also states that investors are risk averse, which Marks also believes to be untrue. He points to a lack of risk aversion being one of main causes of the 2008 crisis, as lending was too loose, with risk mis-priced.

Thought-provokingly, he explained that riskier assets only appear to offer higher returns, but often don't actually give higher returns, otherwise they wouldn't be risky!

 

Next, he demonstrated how the risk premium graph (X-axis = risk, Y-axis = return) fluctuates, becoming too shallow a line when investors are complacent, e.g. prior to 2008, when very little premium was demanded for considerable risk, or too steep in times…

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